Pakistan today stands at a critical juncture. A renewed wave of terrorism has rekindled serious concerns about the nation’s internal security. Incidents like the Jaffar Express hijacking serve as stark reminders that traditional responses to these challenges are no longer adequate. The resurgence of the Baloch separatist insurgency and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) campaign have once again placed Pakistan’s stability, security, and territorial integrity under severe strain. In this climate of heightened threat, the revival and full implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) has become not just necessary, but urgent.
The National Action Plan was first introduced in December 2014, following the horrific Army Public School (APS) Peshawar attack. The massacre of over 140 innocent people, most of them schoolchildren, shocked the nation and galvanized both civil and military leadership into action. Out of this national tragedy emerged NAP, a 20-point counterterrorism framework designed to eliminate extremism and terrorism from the country. It was a comprehensive policy aimed at addressing both the operational and ideological roots of militancy.
Initially, NAP led to a series of significant military operations, including Zarb-e-Azb and Raddul-Fasaad, which successfully dismantled many militant networks. However, as time passed and the immediate threat appeared to subside, the momentum to implement NAP in its entirety faded. While progress was visible in terms of kinetic actions, the political, social, and educational reforms outlined in the plan remained largely neglected.
In recognition of changing dynamics and evolving threats, NAP was revised in 2021. The updated blueprint laid equal emphasis on kinetic (military and law enforcement) and nonkinetic (political, social, and economic) strategies. The objective was to craft a balanced and sustainable response to militancy—combining force where necessary with measures aimed at addressing the underlying grievances that foster insurgency and extremism. Despite the revision, implementation remains inconsistent and incomplete. Pakistan’s security forces have delivered notable successes on the battlefield, neutralizing high-profile militant leaders and destroying terrorist sanctuaries. However, the non-kinetic dimensions of NAP, such as reconciliation efforts, justice reforms, governance improvements, and socioeconomic uplift, have been severely lacking.
This uneven implementation raises critical questions. Has NAP been carried out as envisioned? On paper, the framework promises a holistic solution. In practice, however, its partial application has failed to address the fundamental drivers of unrest in regions like Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. There is no doubt that kinetic actions—military operations and law enforcement interventions—are essential for disrupting militant networks and restoring security. Without these, the state’s writ would be eroded, especially in restive areas. But these victories on the security front are temporary if they are not followed by meaningful political engagement and development initiatives.
The non-kinetic components of NAP are critical for long-term stability. Unfortunately, these have been sidelined by successive governments. Reconciliation efforts in Balochistan have yet to take off in earnest, and the merged districts of KP (formerly FATA) remain marginalized and underdeveloped. Without genuine political inclusion, social services, and economic opportunities, these regions will remain vulnerable to exploitation by insurgents and extremist ideologues.
In Balochistan, despite its wealth in natural resources, many communities continue to live in dire poverty. Similarly, the merged areas of KP suffer from chronic underdevelopment and a lack of political representation. These conditions foster deep resentment, which militant groups are quick to exploit. Deprivation, marginalization, and the absence of genuine political freedom create fertile ground for recruitment into extremist causes. Addressing these challenges requires more than military operations. There needs to be a serious, sustained reconciliation process and inclusive governance that empowers local communities. Unfortunately, the political will to take these bold steps has been lacking, leaving the root causes of militancy unaddressed.
The path forward demands reconciliation and reintegration efforts aimed at militants willing to renounce violence and enter the political mainstream. However, these efforts must be conducted within firm red lines: Pakistan’s territorial integrity and constitutional supremacy cannot be compromised. Any dialogue or political settlement must reinforce national unity and uphold the rule of law.
The time for half-measures is over. If Pakistan is to break the cycle of insurgency and violence, it must implement the National Action Plan in its entirety—in both kinetic and non-kinetic spheres. The burden cannot fall solely on the shoulders of security forces. Civilian leadership, along with provincial governments, must take ownership of governance reforms, socioeconomic initiatives, and political reconciliation. Without a comprehensive approach, Pakistan risks falling into a repetitive cycle of instability. It is not enough to suppress terrorism militarily; the state must address the structural inequities and grievances that give rise to militancy in the first place.
The National Action Plan remains Pakistan’s most coherent and comprehensive strategy to counter terrorism and extremism. But its success hinges on implementation—not just in military terms, but in political and social arenas as well. Pakistan’s leadership must show the vision and determination to fulfill the promises made under NAP. Only through a holistic, inclusive approach can Pakistan hope to restore peace, ensure stability, and secure a better future for all its citizens
